What a certificate of forgetting actually certifies

Notes on (ε, δ)-certified removal, the Newton-step update behind it, and what the guarantee does and does not say about a deployed model.

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RESEARCH
On this page
  1. The definition
  2. A one-step removal for convex losses
  3. What it does not certify
  4. Where this leaves deep networks
  5. Open questions
  6. Footnotes#

Sample post: the maths below is a faithful sketch, but treat the numbers as illustrative.

Machine unlearning asks a deceptively simple question: after a model has been trained on a dataset DD, how do we remove the influence of one example zz without paying for a full retrain? The interesting part is not the removal. It is deciding what it means to say the removal worked.

The definition

Let A\mathcal{A} be a learning algorithm and M\mathcal{M} a removal mechanism. Write D′=D∖{z}D' = D \setminus \{z\}. We say M\mathcal{M} performs (ε,δ)(\varepsilon, \delta)-certified removal if, for every measurable set of models T\mathcal{T},

Pr⁡[M(A(D),D,z)∈T]  ≤  eε Pr⁡[A(D′)∈T]+δ,\Pr\big[\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}(D), D, z) \in \mathcal{T}\big] \;\le\; e^{\varepsilon}\,\Pr\big[\mathcal{A}(D') \in \mathcal{T}\big] + \delta,

and symmetrically with the two probabilities swapped. This borrows its shape from differential privacy, but notice the asymmetry: the reference distribution is retraining from scratch, not a neighbouring dataset in the abstract.1

The practical reading is a hypothesis test. An adversary who sees the final weights should not be able to tell, with advantage larger than ε\varepsilon and δ\delta allow, whether zz was ever in the training set.

A one-step removal for convex losses

For an L2L_2-regularised, strongly convex objective, a single Newton step gives a closed-form correction. If θ⋆\theta^\star minimises the loss on DD and HH is the Hessian of the loss over D′D' at θ⋆\theta^\star, then

θ−=θ⋆+H−1 ∇ℓ(θ⋆;z).\theta^{-} = \theta^\star + H^{-1}\,\nabla \ell(\theta^\star; z).

The residual gradient norm ∥∇L(θ−;D′)∥\lVert \nabla L(\theta^{-}; D') \rVert is bounded by a term that shrinks like O(1/n2)O(1/n^2) under smoothness assumptions, so for large datasets the approximation is excellent. Adding calibrated Gaussian noise to the training objective then converts that small residual into a formal (ε,δ)(\varepsilon, \delta) statement.

newton_removal.py python
import numpy as np

def remove_example(theta, X, y, i, lam):
    """One Newton step that removes example i from a ridge-regularised logistic model."""
    n, d = X.shape
    keep = np.arange(n) != i
    Xk, yk = X[keep], y[keep]

    p = 1.0 / (1.0 + np.exp(-Xk @ theta))
    H = (Xk.T * (p * (1 - p))) @ Xk + lam * (n - 1) * np.eye(d)

    pi = 1.0 / (1.0 + np.exp(-X[i] @ theta))
    grad_i = (pi - y[i]) * X[i]          # gradient of the removed example's loss
    return theta + np.linalg.solve(H, grad_i)

The cost is one Hessian solve, O(d3)O(d^3), independent of nn once HH is cached. Retraining is O(nd⋅iterations)O(nd \cdot \text{iterations}).

What it does not certify

The guarantee is about the weights. It says nothing about everything downstream of them. A short, deliberately incomplete list:

ArtefactCovered by the certificate?Why
Final weights θ−\theta^{-}YesThis is what the definition constrains
Logged training gradientsNoNot part of M\mathcal{M}‘s output
Embeddings cached in a vector storeNoComputed from weights before removal
Outputs already served to usersNoHistory cannot be edited
Fine-tuned descendantsNoThey inherit the old weights

Where this leaves deep networks

Everything above leans on convexity. For deep networks the Hessian is indefinite and the residual bound is unavailable, so published methods fall back to empirical audits: membership-inference tests, or comparing against retrained models over many seeds. Those are useful, but they estimate risk; they do not certify it.2

Open questions

  1. Can the residual bound be restored for overparameterised models near initialisation, where training behaves almost linearly?
  2. How should a certificate compose when removal requests arrive sequentially and each uses a noisy update?
  3. What is the right reference distribution when the “retrained” model would itself depend on random data order?

Footnotes#

  1. The reference distribution being retraining is the key design choice. It makes the guarantee operational: the regulator’s mental model is “as if you had never seen it”. ↩

  2. Reporting an empirical audit alongside a certificate on the convex part of a pipeline is, in my view, the honest middle ground. ↩

Where to next?

Writing / Research